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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






KAREEM HASSAN MILLHOUSE, 




WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-01971) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2016 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Kareem Hassan Millhouse, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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U.S.C. § 2241.  His petition sought relief from sanctions imposed in prison disciplinary 
proceedings.  We will affirm. 
 According to the incident report, on December 14, 2013, pursuant to a contraband 
search of the cell assigned to Millhouse, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) staff found an 
orange bag filled with homemade intoxicants.  An Alcosensor test was conducted and the 
liquid tested positive for being an intoxicant.  An incident report was filed and provided 
to Millhouse.  When the investigating officer informed Millhouse of the incident report 
and his rights, Millhouse stated, “[t]he report is correct, I can’t dispute it.”  The 
investigator referred the incident report to the Unit Discipline Committee “(UDC”).  
Millhouse appeared before the UDC and declined to make a statement.  The UDC 
referred the charge to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for further proceedings.  
 Millhouse was informed of his rights at a discipline hearing on December 17, 
2013.  Millhouse did not request a staff representative or to call any witnesses.  On 
January 8, 2014, Millhouse appeared before DHO Lane for his discipline hearing and 
admitted to possessing alcohol.  Based on Millhouse’s admission and the supporting 
documentation, DHO Lane concluded that the evidence supported a finding that 
Millhouse committed the prohibited act.  DHO Lane sanctioned Millhouse to a 
disallowance of good conduct time of forty days and a loss of visiting and commissary 
privileges for ninety days.  The DHO documented his findings in a written report and 
notified Millhouse of his appellate rights.  
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 On October 10, 2014, Millhouse filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his due process rights were violated during the 
disciplinary proceedings.  The District Court denied his petition.  Millhouse timely 
appealed.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Millhouse’s procedural due 
process challenge to the disciplinary hearing was properly brought under § 2241 because 
it entailed the loss of good time credits.  See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-46 
(1997).  We review the District Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo and its factual 
findings for clear error.  Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 In his brief, Millhouse argues that a different disciplinary hearing, regarding an 
incident where a knife was found in his mattress, violated his constitutional right to due 
process.1  It is well established that arguments not raised before the District Court are 
waived on appeal.  DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Moreover, Millhouse failed entirely to address in his brief the disciplinary hearing he 
challenged in his habeas corpus petition, and this failure constitutes a waiver on appeal.  
                                              
1 Millhouse’s habeas petition does not describe the incident underlying the disciplinary 
hearing he challenged.  In response to the petition, the Respondent explained that, 
although Millhouse did not provide a date, report number, or description of the incident, 
he provided the administrative remedy numbers issued in his administrative appeal.  With 
this information, the Respondent determined the disciplinary hearing occurred on January 
8, 2014, and concerned Millhouse’s possession of alcohol on December 14, 2013.  See 
Response, Dkt. 6 at 1-2 n.1.  In his objections, Millhouse did not challenge the 
Respondent’s characterization of his petition as challenging the disciplinary hearing for 
his possession of alcohol.  
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United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an 
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of 
that issue on appeal.”).   In any event, the District Court correctly denied Millhouse’s 
petition.  
 A disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of good time credit must provide 
certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including:  (1) at least 24-hour advance 
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence; and (3) a written decision explaining the evidence relied upon and the reasons 
for the disciplinary action.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974).  The 
Supreme Court has held that “revocation of good time does not comport with the 
minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison 
disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 
472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  This standard 
is not stringent and the relevant inquiry “is whether there is any evidence in the record 
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56. 
 Millhouse contended in the District Court that he was precluded from appearing at 
his disciplinary hearing.  He has failed to substantiate this claim.  To the contrary, the 
evidence supports the District Court’s finding that Millhouse was present for his hearing 
before the DHO and that he was provided the requisite procedural safeguards.  Millhouse 
was provided notice of the charges against him, had the opportunity to present witnesses 
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and evidence, and received a copy of the DHO’s written report.  The charge was 
supported by Millhouse’s admissions and BOP staff reports, and no contradictory 
evidence was presented.  Although Millhouse requested that the District Court obtain and 
review a surveillance video, the District Court correctly declined to do so as minimum 
requirements of procedural due process do “not require examination of the entire record, 
independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”  
Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
